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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that individual investor sentiment has incremental explanatory power 
for returns of small cap stocks, value stocks, stocks with low institutional ownership, and stocks 
with lower prices (Kumar and Lee (2003)) and that there is a strong link between institutional sen-
timent and the returns of large stocks (Brown and Cliff (2004)). With respect to return volatility, 
Jackson (2003a,b) found that larger trading share of individuals in certain stocks does not increase 
their subsequent volatility; however, the opposite is true for institutional participation, which in-
creases conditional volatility. We propose an integrated framework that jointly tests for the effects 
of individual as well as institutional sentiment on return and volatility. Using implicit measures of 
sentiment for the German stock market over the period 02/2000 until 04/2005, our results suggest 
that institutional sentiment has only minor incremental explanatory power for returns and condi-
tional volatility of large cap stocks, but we find strong evidence that individual sentiment is the 
important market-wide risk factor and does affect the return and conditional volatility of large as 
well as small cap stocks. 
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1  Introduction 
The rationality of investors lies at the core of the classical understanding of financial markets 
and security prices. Investors are assumed to be Bayesian in forming fully rational expecta-
tions about future returns and risks, given the relevant information available to them. Conse-
quently, they correctly price securities at their fundamental value. However, even classical 
theory acknowledges that some investors might not be all that rational – they trade on noise 
rather than information. Nevertheless, as long as their misperceptions are uncorrelated, they 
are likely to cancel out or disappear from the market, as they tend to buy high and sell low, 
which has devastating wealth effects in the long run. Finally, even if misperceptions across 
irrational investors are correlated, the remaining rational investors would engage in arbitrage 
and bring prices back to fundamental value. This argument has been most forcefully made 
both by Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965). In the ideal case, arbitrage guarantees a riskless 
profit and as a result, arbitrageurs will crowd out irrational investors. 
The most voluminous set of critique questions the classical view of investors’ ration-
ality. Black (1986) laid the foundation by emphasizing the role of noise on a wide range of 
economic activities, including financial markets. Black contrasts noise with information. In a 
financial context, information is relevant news about fundamentals of risk and return, 
whereas noise is irrelevant news. According to his predictions, trading on noise is a vital 
function that only makes financial markets possible. If there are only trades on information, 
“taking the other side’s information into account, is it still worth trading?” (Black, p. 531). 
Thus noise trading, defined as trading on irrelevant information as if it were relevant, pro-
vides liquidity to informed traders, but it also makes stock prices noisy as they reflect the 
opinions of noise traders alongside the fundamentals of risk and return. Consequently, prices 
will be less efficient, which encourages informed traders to engage in the market, as they 
should be able to exploit their informational advantage. However, if their information is al-
ready priced, their trading would resemble noise trading, which makes the distinction be-
tween both groups blurry. If unsophisticated traders act on noise as if it was value-relevant 
information, it becomes possible for events such as index inclusions to influence prices and 
push prices away from the fundamental value. Volatility of prices will thus be greater than 
volatility of the fundamental value, and it will change over time. In sum, “noise creates the 
opportunity to trade profitably, but at the same time makes it difficult to trade profitably” 
(Black, p. 534). 
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De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990, DSSW henceforth) formulate a 
theoretical model that demonstrates the effect the participation of noise traders in financial 
markets has and which implications their misperceptions have for expected returns and vola-
tility. In their model, two classes of investors interact: rational investors and noise traders. 
Whereas the first hold fully rational expectations about future stock returns, the latter trade on 
an external, noisy signal that differs from information. This signal is sentiment, which is ab-
stract for expectations that are formed subject to behavioural and cognitive biases and thus 
need not be completely rational. Misperceptions may induce noise traders to take irrational 
positions, thus driving prices away from fundamental value through their trading activity. If 
arbitrageurs have finite horizons and are risk averse (Shleifer & Vishny (1997)), stochastic 
noise trader sentiment creates a risk, as prices may deviate even more from value in the short 
run. Arbitrageurs concerned with liquidating their positions in the foreseeable future are 
likely to perceive this as an additional risk and limit their positions. Consequently, even in the 
absence of fundamental risk, noise trader sentiment, if systematic, creates a risk that limits 
arbitrage and thus allows prices to persistently differ from fundamental value. Furthermore, 
noise trader risk lowers asset prices as arbitrageurs pull out. If noise traders’ opinions then 
entice themselves to invest in these assets, their expected return may be higher than the arbi-
trageurs’. Consequently, through their mere existence, “noise traders can earn higher relative 
expected returns solely by bearing more of the risk they themselves create” (DSSW, p. 706). 
It is important to realise that noise traders do not necessarily have to be pessimistic about a 
security in order to drive its price down – underpricing is simply an adjustment for the risk 
created by the variability of misperception or sentiment. These results have severe implica-
tions for the functioning of markets, but also bear consequences for asset price. 
In this paper, we study the impact of the unpredictability of investor sentiment – of fu-
ture noise trader demand for assets – on the return and conditional volatility of the German 
stock market. Using implicit measures of individual as well as institutional sentiment, we are 
able to empirically investigate the relationship between the opinions of different classes of 
investors and stock prices. While the empirical evidence regarding that issue is mixed, we are 
the first to use an integrated framework to jointly test the impact of individual and institu-
tional sentiment on prices.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review empirical 
researches that study the influence of noise traders on stock prices. Section 3 explains the 
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data and defines the quantitative model, Section 4 discusses the empirical analysis, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes. 
 
2 Investor sentiment and stock returns 
In a first attempt to test the influence of noise traders on stock returns, Kelly (1997) examines 
what consequences the extent of noise trader participation has on returns. He conjectures that 
higher participation of noise traders is a negative predictor of stock returns, as noise traders 
tend to buy high and sell low (DSSW’s “Friedman” effect)1. He assumes that the likelihood 
of a person to be a noise trader diminishes with household income, while the opposite is true 
for the chance of being smart money. Investors from intermediate-income households are 
assumed to be passive investors who do not have a direct bearing on the variation of stock 
market prices. His empirical results, after analysing data on U.S. dividend income tax from 
1947-1980, support the theoretical predictions. Higher market participation by noise traders is 
a negative predictor of stock returns, while the opposite holds for smart money participation. 
The share of intermediate-income investors had no predictive power. Kelly thus managed to 
first pinpoint the influence of noise traders on stock market prices. However, he did not ven-
ture into making predictions about the nature of investor sentiment’s influence on the varia-
tion in stock market prices. Consequently, researchers after that started running tests of how 
some measure of sentiment is statistically related to the movement in stock prices. In this 
field, two general approaches are to be distinguished, regarding the nature of the sentiment 
variable. The first is to formulate proxies of investor sentiment that are somewhat justified by 
financial theory. This is done by taking observable, objective variables that implicitly indicate 
investor sentiment and use them for statistical analyses. The second approach is to rely on 
explicit, mostly survey-based measures that try to capture the mood of the market more di-
rectly. Both approaches have their advantages and drawbacks. Objectively observable vari-
ables are more reliable with respect to their generation process; however their theoretical link 
to investor sentiment may be debatable. On the other hand, while survey-based measures are 
more direct in that respect, they often lack the sample size and statistical representativeness. 
Empirical studies employing both approaches will be reviewed separately in the following.  
                                                 
1 This proposition is not to be confused with DSSW’s finding that noise traders on average earn higher expected 
returns than sophisticated investors. While DSSW are concerned with the unconditional expected returns to 
noise traders, Kelly (1997) refers to expected returns conditional on the participation level of noise traders. 
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2.1 Implicit measures of investor sentiment  
Swaminathan (1996) examines the predictive power of individual investor sentiment for the 
excess expected returns on small firms. In accordance with Lee et al. (1991), he uses an index 
of closed-end fund discounts to proxy for sentiment. His empirical findings are quite unambi-
guous. Individual investor sentiment, as reflected in closed-end fund discounts, is able to 
forecast small firm returns. The information contained in the sentiment index is independent 
from other macro-economic variables such as the dividend yield on the market and term 
spread. Closed-end fund discounts only forecast the small firm factor, but in that they are ex-
clusive. These results seem to support the hypothesis of Lee et al. that, as individual investors 
are the major shareholders in small firm and close-end fund shares, the fluctuating discounts 
should reflect their irrational sentiment and forecast small firm returns. However, as his 
closed-end fund discount index also seems to be correlated with expectations of future earn-
ings growth and expected inflation, Swaminathan suggests that closed-end fund discounts 
reflect investors’ rational expectations, rather than irrational sentiment. Nevertheless, in his 
study closed-end fund discounts were able to forecast returns. In contrast to that, Elton, Gru-
ber and Busse (1998) present evidence against the theory of Lee et al. They show that an in-
dex of closed-end fund discounts enters the return-generating process of small firms not more 
often than expected by chance and even less than purely non-fundamental industry-indices 
consisting of large, institutionally-held firms. The incorporation of the closed-end fund index 
into an asset pricing model does not yield support for the hypothesis that sentiment is priced 
either. Doukas and Milonas (2004) come to the same conclusion upon extending the work of 
Elton et al. (1998) to an out-of-sample dataset of Greek closed-end funds and stock market 
returns. The latest paper on the subject by Wang (2004) however again supports the use of 
closed-end fund discounts to proxy for sentiment. He constructs portfolios dependent on the 
exposition to closed-end fund discounts and finds significant excess returns than can not be 
explained by traditional financial models such as the one by Fama and French (1993). The 
discussion seems to remain whether closed-end fund discounts are the appropriate indicator 
of investor sentiment. 
Next to closed-end fund discounts, Neal and Wheatley (1998) test two more measures of in-
vestor sentiment: the odd-lot2 balance and net mutual fund redemptions. The first measure 
describes the ratio of odd-lot stock sales to purchases. The theory is that only individual in-
vestors trade in these small quantities. So when they are selling more than they are buying, 
                                                 
2 Odd-lot: a stock transaction with volume of less than 100 stocks bought or sold at a time. 
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they are bearish, which is when the odd-lot balance indicator rises to signal a potential buying 
opportunity for rational investors.3 The same kind of logic applies to net mutual fund redemp-
tions. If investors redeem more shares of mutual funds than others buy, their sentiment is as-
sumed to be low. As small investors hold a high stake in mutual funds, this measure is also 
seen as a proxy for individual investor sentiment4. The findings of Neal and Wheatley (1998) 
suggest that both closed-end fund discounts and net mutual fund redemptions bear explana-
tory power for the small firm premium, while the odd-lot balance does not seem to have a 
meaning in this respect. However, once the so-called Keim-Stambaugh factor (the cross-
sectional average share price of small firms) is included in the analysis, only net mutual fund 
redemptions remain a statistically significant factor in explaining small firm excess returns. 
Along the same lines of argumentation, Brown et al. (2002) confirm the applicability of mu-
tual fund flows. They construct a new index from mutual fund flow data, and validate that it 
is priced, both for the U.S. and Japan. 
The approach to draw inferences about investor sentiment from trading statistics such as the 
odd-lot balance has been taken to the next level by Kumar and Lee (2003), Jackson (2003a), 
and Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2005). Kumar and Lee (2003) examine a dataset from a major 
discount broker. They find that the broker’s clients – individual investors – seem to trade sys-
tematically, in that their trading activity is correlated. This is the prerequisite for their activi-
ties to influence market prices. Their measure of investor sentiment – basically the ratio of 
share sales to purchases – is also highly correlated with recommendations from investment 
newsletters. Individual investors seem to adhere to this “expert” advice. Next, Kumar and Lee 
discover that their measure of retail investor sentiment “has incremental explanatory power 
for [returns of] small stocks, value stocks, stocks with low institutional ownership, and stocks 
with lower prices” (p. 4f). Their statistics show that when investors are bullish, these stocks 
earn higher excess returns. Finally, to further explore the significance of their sentiment 
measure, they relate it to observed seasonal patterns such as the January effect and the Day-
of-the-Week effect. While they find strong evidence that retail investor sentiment partly ex-
plains the January effect, fluctuations in sentiment do not seem to have a special impact on 
particular weekdays. 
The analysis by Jackson (2003a) is similar, but comes to different conclusions. He uses an 
extensive dataset of some 40 million trades with Australian retail brokers. Analogous to 
Kumar and Lee, he finds that trading is significantly correlated on the market and cross-
                                                 
3 This line of argumentation goes back to Hardy (1939). 
4 Malkiel (1977) first suggested that net mutual fund redemptions reflect “general investor sentiment” (p. 856). 
 7
sectional level, and both within and across broker firms. Investors exhibit patterns of negative 
feedback trading, i.e. they buy after losses and sell after gains, a behaviour normally not as-
sociated with individual investors. Consequently, trading patterns by individual investors 
positively forecast short-term subsequent returns, which is at odds with the general assump-
tion of small investor irrationality.  
Kaniel et al. (2005) analyse another dataset on individual investor trades, this time from the 
New York Stock Exchange. Their analysis shows two things. First, individual investors seem 
to be quite good at predicting short-term returns. Stocks that experience a surge in individual 
buying for one week show an average excess return of 1.4% for the following 20 days. How-
ever, the contrary is not evident: stocks that individual investors sell do not perform worse 
than average in the following 20 days. Secondly, and quite surprisingly, Kaniel et al. discover 
that individual investors seem to follow contrarian investment strategies: “The mean market-
adjusted returns in the 20 days prior to a week of intense individual selling is 3.97%, while 
prior to a week of intense individual buying it is −2.54%” (p. 3). These results mirror those of 
Jackson (2003a). In contrast to Kumar and Lee (2003) and Jackson, however, they can not 
confirm that the trading activity of individual investors is correlated across stocks, so that 
sentiment does not pose a systematic factor that should be priced in equilibrium.  
Summarizing, closed-end fund discounts do not seem to be able to explain subsequent stock 
returns, while net mutual fund flows could be more a promising statistic. Detailed data on the 
trading behaviour of individual investors yields surprising implications. While the trading of 
individual investors can explain part of the subsequent variation in stock prices, this relation-
ship seems to be positive. When sentiment is high, subsequent returns tend to be more posi-
tive. Surprisingly, investors seem to follow contrarian strategies themselves – they buy after 
low returns, and sell after gains. Individual trading seems to be highly correlated.  
After closed-end fund discounts and other implicit measures of investor sentiment had been 
studied extensively, researchers turned to explicit, i.e. survey-based, measures in order to 
confirm their conclusions with data presumed to reflect sentiment more directly. These stud-
ies will be treated in the following section.  
2.2 Explicit measures of investor sentiment 
Fisher and Statman (2000) were among the first to include survey-based measures of investor 
sentiment into their research on opinions of different classes of investors. They identified 
three groups: small (individual) investors, medium investors (newsletter writers), and large, 
institutional investors (Wall Street strategists). First, to measure the sentiment of small inves-
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tors, they drew on the weekly surveys the American Association of Individual Investors 
(AAII), which has collected weekly data since 1987. Members of AAII simply classify them-
selves as bullish, bearish or neutral. Fisher and Statman (2000) use the percentage of bearish 
investors as their sentiment indicator. Second, in order to capture the appraisement of news-
letter writers, the service of Investors Intelligence (II) has been employed. Also on a weekly 
basis, since 1964 II classifies opinions published in newsletters as bullish, bearish or waiting 
for a correction. Again, Fisher and Statman take the percentage of bearish newsletter writers 
as their measure of sentiment. Finally, data compiled by Merrill Lynch quantifies institutional 
sentiment. The investment bank determines the share of stock in portfolios recommended by 
up to 20 investment strategists on a monthly basis since 1985. Drawing on these time-series, 
Fisher and Statman arrive at several findings. First, while sentiment of individuals and news-
letter writers is significantly (though not perfectly) correlated, the investment bankers did not 
seem to follow any of the two. Fisher and Statman then turn to the predictive power of the 
sentiment measures for next-month stock returns, both for the S&P 500 and an index of small 
stocks. While all regressions yield negative coefficients for the sentiment variables, suggest-
ing their potential use as a contrary indicator, the only significant relationship is between 
small investor sentiment and next-month S&P 500 returns. Subsequently, the issue of the in-
fluence of returns on sentiment is examined, so that the variables in the regressions are basi-
cally flipped. The results are quite clear. Both small investors and newsletter writers are 
strongly influenced by past returns. After periods of positive market developments, their sen-
timent rises significantly. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the assumptions of e.g. Lee, Shleifer 
and Thaler (1991), individual investors seem follow the development of the S&P 500 more 
closely than small-cap stocks. The same is true for newsletter writers. In contrast, Wall Street 
strategists’ opinions are not that easily influenced by past returns, which again is in line with 
the general assumption of their relative rationality. Finally, individual investors’ allocation of 
funds to stocks is examined through AAII fund allocation survey data. Luckily for them, 
small investors do not seem to act on their sentiment. While surges in their sentiment tend to 
be followed by negative S&P 500 returns, returns tend to be higher after small investors in-
vest more of their funds in stocks, so they do not seem that irrational after all. 
In another study, Solt and Statman (2001) investigated whether investment strategies based 
on sentiment indicators can be profitable. They concentrate on the Investors Intelligence in-
dex and relate it to Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) returns. They conclude that “there 
is no statistically significant relation between the index and changes in the DJIA in the subse-
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quent four-week periods”, so that the “sentiment index is not useful as a contrary indicator” 
(Solt & Statman, 2001, p. 47). 
Fisher and Statman (2004) investigated the expectations by individual investors and Wall 
Street strategists again, this time on the background of the millennium stock market bubble. 
They use postings on Yahoo message boards and results form both the Gallup/UBS and 
BusinessWeek surveys to gauge the opinion of investors during times of high gains and 
losses around the 2000 stock market bubble. Again, sentiment seems to follow returns, as 
reflected in a higher percentage of optimistic investors at the climax of the market compared 
to the trough in the middle of 2002. Wall Street investors however, according to Busi-
nessWeek surveys, were less bullish after strong gains, but became more so after the crash of 
the market, in contrast to the bearish individual investors at the time. This is in line with their 
previous findings. They conclude that “stock price of the late 1990s were likely driven higher 
by the exuberance of  investors about their favourite individual stocks, as captured on the Ya-
hoo message boards, or by the combined drive of many investors, each with modest expecta-
tions” (Fisher & Statman, 2002, p. 20).  
Brown and Cliff perform two extensive studies on the relationship of measures of investor 
sentiment and stock returns. While in Brown and Cliff (2002) they examine the long-run ef-
fects of investor sentiment on stock returns, they concentrate on the near-term stock market in 
their later study (G. W. Brown & Cliff, 2004). In their analysis, Brown and Cliff (2002) test 
two basic hypotheses:  
 1.  “Excessive optimism leads to periods of market overvaluation”, and 
 2.  “High current sentiment is followed by low cumulative long-run returns” 
They focus on the long-run reversal of returns to fundamental value, as arbitrage that could 
force prices back to value might be effective in the short run, but limited in the long. The first 
hypothesis is tested by relating sentiment as reflected in the aforementioned Investors Intelli-
gence (II) surveys to S&P 500 pricing errors. The second hypothesis is investigated by find-
ing significant relationships between high levels of sentiment and subsequent returns on the 
Fama and French (1993) and other portfolios over differing horizons. In all their analyses 
Brown and Cliff use ten control variables to distinguish the rational part of sentiment from 
the irrational. After all, changes in sentiment may not be completely irrational, but also sim-
ply reflect changes in fundamental factors. Their results are coherent. First, investor senti-
ment is significant in explaining parts of stock market misvaluations, even in presence of 
control variables. Second, positive shocks (over one standard deviation) to investor sentiment 
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are nearly always followed by reduced returns over horizons of six, twelve, 24 and 36 
months. 
Summarizing, survey-based measures help to better understand the formation of investor sen-
timent and its impact on the behaviour of stock markets. Sentiment seems to follow recent 
stock market developments. Especially individual investors seem to become more bullish 
after gains on the stock market. Wall Street strategists in contrast seem to be less enthusiastic 
in bull markets, however they do believe in faster recovery when in bear markets. Optimistic 
investors are possibly able to influence market valuations and make them less efficient, espe-
cially over longer horizons. Finally, surges in survey-based sentiment indicators seem to be 
followed by negative returns, which would render them candidates for contrarian indicators.  
2.3 Combined im- and explicit measures of investor sentiment 
Both implicit and explicit measures of investor sentiment have been employed which were 
partly able to add to the discussion on whether investor sentiment is an important determinant 
of stock returns. However, it has remained unclear which measures are actually most appro-
priate, and to which extent they represent the same informational content. To further clarify 
this issue, two studies have gone further and attempted to integrate several measures.  
The aforementioned research by Brown and Cliff (2004) complements their study of long-
term return patterns and sentiment in that they focus on short-term effects this time. They 
come to their conclusions in two steps. First, they explore the interrelationships of a wide 
range of implicit and explicit measures of sentiment. Second, the explanatory power of inves-
tor sentiment for stock returns is inspected. As others before, Brown and Cliff (2004) rely on 
the AAII and II survey data. For the implicit measures, they use a wide range from indicators 
of recent market performance (e.g. the ARMS index), type of trading activity (e.g. the odd-lot 
balance, short sales activity), derivatives variables (e.g. put/call ratio, implied volatility) to 
IPO data (number of offerings, first day returns) and others such as the known closed-end 
funds discounts and mutual fund flows5. Their first main result is that all these measures con-
tain similar information, which is why they use integration techniques such as the Kalman 
filter and principal components analysis in order to arrive at new, unobserved measures of 
sentiment. These measures correlate significantly with contemporaneous returns. Further, 
causal analysis reveals that while returns strongly affect subsequent swings in sentiment, 
“very little evidence suggests sentiment causes subsequent market returns” (G. W. Brown & 
                                                 
5 See Brown and Cliff (2004) for a complete and detailed overview of the used indicators as well as their com-
mon classification as bullish or bearish  
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Cliff, p. 3). Finally, and surprisingly, the strongest link between sentiment and returns ap-
pears to be between institutional sentiment and large stocks. Although statistically not sig-
nificant, this relationship would counter the usual assumptions that individual investors are 
the ones to add noise to stock prices.  
The second, extensive study that integrates several measures of investor sentiment has been 
presented by Baker and Wurgler (2004). While Brown and Cliff use marketwide return data, 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) discuss cross-sectional differences in the time-series of stock re-
turns. They propose two distinct mechanisms through which the cross-sectional return differ-
ences might become evident. First, sentiment, which they define as “propensity to speculate” 
(p. 5) might differ across stocks. The value of stocks with certain characteristics might be 
more subjective than for others, which allows inexperienced investors to justify a range of 
valuations. Then, e.g. in a bull market when people want to invest, they buy these stocks be-
cause they expect prices to rise to the upper end of their pricing range. Second, arbitrage pos-
sibilities might vary across stocks. As the values of stocks with certain characteristics are 
more subjective, arbitrageurs cannot objectively determine value either, which limits arbi-
trage for these stocks. In effect, both mechanisms lead to the same result: some stocks are 
more susceptible to misvaluations. If that was true, they would display distinct return pattern 
when prices and values converge eventually. In particular, Baker and Wurgler suppose that if 
changing sentiment caused mispricings, it would have a comparatively higher impact on 
young, small, highly volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend paying, high-growth or distressed 
stocks. Their methodology is simple: After splitting their records into high and low levels of 
marketwide beginning-of-period sentiment, they sort corresponding stock returns by every 
aforementioned characteristic, respectively. Just as Brown and Cliff, they employ a wide 
range of implicit sentiment measures, although they do not make use of survey data. Unlike 
Brown and Cliff, they orthogonalize these indicators with respect to several macroeconomic 
variables6. By that technique, Baker and Wurgler filter some rational content reflected in sen-
timent from their indicators in order to achieve cleaner measures for the irrational mood 
swings of investors. Their results are clear: when initial sentiment is low, smaller, younger, 
higher-return volatility, more unprofitable, non-dividend paying, high-growth and distressed 
stocks earn higher returns in the following month than their counterparts. When sentiment is 
high, the effects reverse. The empirical evidence thus supports the theoretical predictions that 
firms with these characteristics are more affected by swings in sentiment, so that when inves-
                                                 
6 See Baker and Wurgler (2004) for an overview of used indicators and variables  
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tors are bearish, they are undervalued and thus show above-average subsequent returns, and 
vice-versa.  
Summarizing, the integration of several measures of sentiment has proven a fruitful approach 
to exploring the relationship of investor sentiment and stock returns. On a marketwide basis, 
integrated measures of sentiment are not yet able to forecast returns. For the cross-section of 
stocks, the opposite is true. Stocks with subjective valuations are influenced by swings in sen-
timent and show distinguishable return patterns. 
2.4. Investor sentiment, volatility and stock returns 
Only few researchers have ventured into the field of relating investor sentiment to volatility. 
Nevertheless, this seems appropriate, as “the most fundamental prediction of the noise trader-
model is that irrational investors acting in concert on a noisy signal […] cause a risk” (G. W. 
Brown, 1999, p. 84) which can reasonably assumed to be volatility. Brown (1999) investi-
gates this issue by relating AAII sentiment survey data to closed-end fund discount volatility. 
Through his parsimonious regression analysis, he reveals several things. First, deviations 
from mean levels of sentiment lead to statistically significant higher discount volatility, 
which supports noise trader theory as it suggests that sentiment poses a systematic risk. Sec-
ond, Brown shows that extreme levels of investor sentiment affect discounts only during trad-
ing hours, which is a prerequisite for the theory that noise traders influence prices through 
their trading activity. The fact that the number of trades in closed-end funds is significantly 
higher in periods of extreme sentiment corroborates this finding. Finally, when sentiment is 
extreme, total trading volume does not increase, meaning that the average trade size de-
creases, so that “the larger traders actually give way, to some degree, to noise traders” (p. 88). 
With his study, Brown laid the foundation for studying the impact of sentiment on volatility.  
Extending the focus to a broader equity market context, Jackson (2003b) uses the same data-
base as in his companion paper (Jackson, 2003a). He comes to surprising results. Larger trad-
ing share of individuals in certain stocks does not increase their subsequent volatility. Addi-
tionally, individual participation does not lead stock returns to be correlated with a small 
stock portfolio. However, the opposite is true for institutional participation, which increases 
conditional volatility and leads to a higher correlation with other, mostly institutionally held 
stocks. Finally, Jackson finds a significant noise trader risk factor that is priced in equilib-
rium. In line with his previous results, and in contrast to the common interpretation of noise 
trader theory, the source of this risk seems to be institutional traders. According to Jackson, 
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“institutional frictions are a much more plausible source of non-fundamental demand shocks 
than is an individual sentiment effect” (p. 6).  
The next step was to integrate all former work and conduct an empirical study that incorpo-
rates the elements of sentiment, returns, and risk (volatility). This is exactly what W.Y. Lee, 
Jiang and Indro (2002) have done. They start off by arguing that empirical models that ana-
lyse only the impact of sentiment on either expected returns or volatility are “mispecified and 
at best incomplete” (p. 2280). This holds as the DSSW theory, to which they closely adhere, 
states four effects that affect returns, both directly and through the effects of changing mis-
perceptions on return volatility. Consequently, an empirical model should include both chan-
nels, and not focus merely on returns. They propose a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) in-mean model. As returns, Lee et al. (2002) employ data from 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ, and S&P 500 indices. To model investor sen-
timent, survey data from Investors Intelligence is used, just as in several studies before. The 
empirical results are consistent with the noise trader model. Lee et al. find that “investor sen-
timent is an important factor in explaining equity excess returns and changes in conditional 
volatility” (p. 2291). Specifically, changes in sentiment are significantly and positively re-
lated to excess returns. This means that the “hold more” effect dominates the adverse “price 
pressure” effect. Investors earn higher expected returns when they are bullish, because their 
optimism leads them to hold more of the risky asset, for which they are compensated. While 
the increased demand for the risky asset increases its price (and thus lowers its expected re-
turn), this does not offset the positive effect completely. In contrast, when investors turn bear-
ish, their trading pushes prices down. They pull out of the risky asset so that they can not reap 
compensation for bearing noise trader risk. Returns are also found to be significantly influ-
enced by volatility, which in turn is subject to changes in sentiment. Bullish shifts in senti-
ment lead to subsequent downward adjustment of future volatility, whereas bearish shifts lead 
to increased volatility. When investors are optimistic, the “create space” effect dominates the 
“Friedman” effect, and thus raises expected returns. However, this relationship turns with 
sentiment when it becomes bearish. Then the space noise traders create is not sufficient any 
more so that their poor market timing hurts them. Their results are robust to the selection of 
sub-periods and different measures of sentiment (absolute vs. % change).  
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3. Data and Econometric Framework 
In this paper, we use survey-based sentiment indicators, as it is the most direct measure of 
investor sentiment. Unlike in the U.S., survey-based sentiment indicators have only recently 
become available for the German stock market. They range from monthly surveys of inves-
tors (“G-Mind”) over monthly summaries of newsletter opinions (“Notes”, similar to the In-
vestor’s Intelligence index) to weekly surveys. As only weekly data seems appropriate for 
this analysis, both the G-Mind and the Notes will not be used here. One weekly index, the 
AnimusX-sentiment, had to be excluded as well, due to a very small sample size as a result of 
data loss on the side of the issuer. This leaves two sentiment indices: the Sentix and the 
Bull/Bear index. The Sentix sentiment index is a weekly, survey-based index issued and pro-
vided by Sentix Behavioral Indices GbR7. It has been published every Friday since February 
2001. The survey method is Internet-based. Registered investors (individual as well as institu-
tional investors seperately) are asked to give their appraisal of the respective market for the 
following month. In total, approximately 1,800 investors are now registered with Sentix.  The 
respondents have three options: either they are bullish, bearish or neutral regarding the re-
spective market (DAX as well as TecDAX). Given the raw data, we construct a sentiment 






NS −= , 
 
where Nbullish and Nneutral refers to the number of respondents that classify themself as 
being bullish or neutral, respectively.  Ntotal refers to the total number of respondents. Values 
of the sentiment index range from 0% to 100%, with larger values implying increased bull-
ishness of market participants. In particular, we construct sentiment indices for individual, 
institutional and total investor sentiment. For the individual (institutional) sentiment index, 
only the opinions of private (institutional) investors are taken into consideration. For the total 
sentiment index, the opinions of all respondents are considered. In addition, we derive indi-
vidual, institutional and total sentiment indices for the DAX as well as for TecDAX market. 
The DAX is a performance index of the 30 largest German ‘blue-chip’ stocks and the 
TecDAX is the market index that reflects the return of smaller companies from the technol-
ogy sector. 
                                                 
7 www.sentix.de. 
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Corresponding to the sentiment index used, the weekly closing prices on the sampling 
weekday (Friday) will be used to calculate a time series of continuously compounded returns. 
Not surprisingly, sentiment of institutional and individual investors are not perfectly 
correlated (~70% correlations in both cases), which reflects a tendency of differing opinions 
between the two groups. This suggests that analysing both individual and institutional senti-
ment separately might be useful in further analysis.  
 
In a first step, we determine an optimal base model for the returns and volatilities of 
both DAX and TecDAX. A general symmetric EGARCH in-mean specification is imple-
mented, which is sufficiently flexible for the purpose at hand (see e.g. Lehnert (2003)). The 
model reads: 
 
  tttt hhr ελµ +=− 2   with )1,0(~ Ntε   and   




−− ++= ttt abshh εβββ  
 
 where rt :  Return for period t 
  µ :  Unconditional Mean 
  λ :  Asset Risk Premium 
  h2:  Conditional Variances 
   
In a next step, we include investor sentiment in the return and conditional variance specifica-
tion. The new model reads8: 
 
ttttt hShr εγλµ +∆+=− 2  with )1,0(~ Ntε  and 




−−− ∆+++= tttt Sabsabshh βεβββ  
  
where  ∆St: Log-Change in investor sentiment in period t 
   
In a final step, we extend the model by incorporating individual and institutional investor 
sentiment separately. The final specification reads: 
                                                 
8 We also worked with the asymmetric version of the model. (Results are not reported, but in line with Lee et al. 
(2002)). However, given the relatively small sample of weekly observations, it is not wise to further increase the 
number of parameters that have to be estimated. The symmetric version of the model is sufficient for the pur-










2 −−−− ∆+∆+++= tinsttindttt SabsSabsabshh ββεβββ  
  
where  ∆Sindt: Log-Change in individual sentiment in period t 
   ∆Sinstt: Log-Change in institutional sentiment in period t 
 
In order to stabilize the estimation process, we numerically control for the fact that the un-
conditional volatility is equal to the sample standard deviation. In order to avoid over-
parameterization, objective model selection criteria have to be employed. The two most 
commonly used model selection criteria are the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria 
(AIC and SIC, respectively). The purpose of model selection criteria is to formalize the trade-
off between goodness of fit and model complexity. However, the standard criteria have to be 
modified in order to account for the particular features of GARCH models (Brooks & Burke, 
2003). The proposed adjusted measures9 are: 
 














 where  n: Number of observations 
  h2: Conditional Variances 
  p: Number of model parameters 
 
Although the resulting absolute values for the criteria are considerably different, the use is 
similar: a lower value for the criterion indicates a better model. Again, the Schwartz criterion 
is more restrictive concerning the use of parameters. 
                                                 
9 For derivation and discussion of the criteria see the appendix in Brooks and Burke (2003)  
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4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports the parameter estimates of the various models and for both market indices. 
The volatility parameter in the mean equation has a positive sign. This is in line with classical 
capital asset pricing theory, which suggests that taking higher risks should be rewarded with 
higher expected returns (French et al. (1987)). However, more recently researchers have en-
countered the opposite phenomenon (Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) and De Santis 
and Gerard (1997)) and argue that a negative relation can occur in times of high savings rates 
and limited alternative investment opportunities, or in times of high inflation and downward 
sloping term structures (Boudoukh, Richardson, & Smith, 1993). A more econometric expla-
nation has been provided by Backus and Gregory (1993), who state that the relationship of 
returns and conditional volatility of asset returns can be positive, negative or flat, depending 
on the preferences of the representative agent and other statistical features.  
 
The first and most important result is that including contemporaneous shifts in senti-
ment in the mean equation improves the model fit significantly (based on the AIC and SIC 
criteria). Most other parameters remain comparable to those of the base model and are in line 
with previous financial research on GARCH modeling. In general, in line with Lee et al. 
(2002), changes in sentiment are positively related to changes in the excess return. Addition-
ally, increased variations in sentiment also increase conditional variance and thus expected 
returns due to the asserted positive λ. In the words of DSSW, the “hold more” effect domi-
nates the “price pressure” effect. When investors becomes more bullish, they invest in assets 
they themselves make riskier than warranted by fundamentals, and thus reap extra returns. 
Additionally, the “create space” effect dominates the “Friedman” effect: increased sentiment 
volatility scares away rational investors, which overly compensates noise traders for their bad 
market timing.  
The next question is which kind of sentiment better explains excess returns and condi-
tional volatility: individual or institutional sentiment. Previous empirical research has mostly 
at least implicitly equalled noise traders with individual investors. They are supposedly “less 
sophisticated” and thus more prone to irrational behaviour. As noise traders have to trade in 
order to benefit from eventual excess returns, it is assumed that their sentiment should affect 
rather small capitalization stocks, which are traded more by individuals. As the DAX is Ger-
many’s blue chip index of stocks that are mainly traded by professionals, individual senti-
ment should accordingly minor incremental explanatory power. The opposite is true. When 
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the sentiment measures are split into individual and institutional, a surprising result can be 
observed. While the other model parameters remain comparable, it becomes obvious that in-
dividual investor sentiment is much more important in comparison to institutional sentiment. 
Apparently, while the impact of noise traders on markets seems significant, previous research 
has not yet clearly revealed their identity. 
For the TecDAX market and using TexDAX Investor Sentiment, the results are com-
parable. Adding sentiment parameters definitely improves the model when contemporaneous 
changes in sentiment are included in the mean equation. Again, individual investor sentiment 
performs better in comparison to institutional sentiment. Apparently, the shifting opinions of 
private investors as reflected in their sentiment has a stronger impact on markets, regardless 
of the type of stocks traded. The impact of changes in investor sentiment is largely similar to 
the DAX models. Bullish shifts in sentiment still raise expected returns, so the “hold more” 
effect still prevails.  
 Overall, adding sentiment always increases model fit significantly. Private investor 
sentiment seems to better explain the interplay of risk and return than institutional sentiment. 
Overall, noise traders seem to benefit from their alleged irrationality and are rewarded with 
higher expected returns, which is exactly in line with the theoretical predictions of DSSW.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an integrated framework that jointly tests for the effects of 
individual as well as institutional sentiment on return and volatility. When contemporaneous 
changes in sentiment are used to explain excess return and conditional volatility, we observe 
a significant improvement in model performance. In contrast to previous US studies, we find 
evidence that in the German stock market, individual sentiment is a market wide risk factor 
and does not only affect small cap stocks. Institutional sentiment has only minor incremental 
explanatory power for returns and conditional volatility of small and large cap stocks. Appar-
ently, while the identity of noise traders is widely acknowledged, their impact on the cross 
section of stock prices was frequently underestimated. However, the results can be interpreted 
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Table 1: Parameter Estimates 
Panel A: DAX 30 
 Excluding Sentiment  
Including 
Total DAX Sentiment 
Including Individual and 
Institutional DAX Sentiment 
   Total Individual Institutional 
hi,t 2.431*  1.431* 1.559* 
∆Si,t   0.041*** 0.035*** 0.006 
β0 -1.200*  -2.022* -1.891* 
ln(hi,t-1) 0.860***  0.790*** 0.806*** 
abs(εi,t-1) 0.344**  0.459* 0.437* 
abs(∆Si,t)   0.880** 0.848** -0.021 
 
MLE 63.6  98.2 98.5 
AIC -1387.3  -1413.7 -1410.4 
SBC -1374.0  -1393.7 -1383.7 
Panel B: TecDAX 
 Excluding Sentiment  
Including 
Total TecDAX Sentiment 
Including Individual and Insti-
tutional TecDAX Sentiment 
   Total Individual Institutional 
hi,t 0.833*  0.839* 0.895* 
∆Si,t   0.050*** 0.033** 0.016 
β0 -0.537*  -0.504* -0.567* 
ln(hi,t-1) 0.941***  0.952*** 0.945*** 
abs(εi,t-1) 0.235**  0.194* 0.206** 
abs(∆Si,t)   0.229* 0.166* 0.081 
 
MLE 25.4  49.7 49.4 
AIC -1229.6  -1240.1 -1236.5 
SBC -1216.2  -1220.0 -1209.8 
Notes. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level 
